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ated with the equally various Renaissances that set the agendum of our field. First, the sheer mastery of others' languages -a characteristic that still marks our field within the contemporary academywhether their otherness be expressed in terms of temporal or spatial distance. Second, the etymological conviction, still regnant, that there is something of surpassing value hidden 'beneath' the words, a something that is essential, as opposed to the verbally accidental, and that may be uncovered only by decipherment; or, the comparable rhetorical conviction that values the givenness of the 'real' concealed 'behind' the words. Third, building on this etymological conviction, the tension between perceptions of unity and diversity in cultural formations was often settled by the postulation of an essential similarity in the face of accidental difference. The accidence to be explained by either environmental differences or the diffusing effects of historical processes. These issues became urgent because of the unanticipated increase of data for variegation, each the product of specific, European, historical causes. To list only three.
(1) The movement north and west of Greek and Hebrew manuscripts following the capture of Constantinople and the expulsion of Jews from Spain, both of these not unrelated to an expansive Islam, presented Renaissance scholars with an internal other, an ancestral past profoundly distant and different from the then European present. A past which was now only accessible through acts of imagination.
(2) The European colonial and mission adventures in the Americas as well as in Africa and Asia gave rise to a number of unanticipated consequences. The unexpected presence of the Americas shattered the classical biblical and Greco-Roman imagination of the inhabited geosphere as a tripartite world-island, thus giving rise to the first new intellectual confrontation with the problem of human and biological difference as possibly signalling otherness.4 Were the Americas created separately? Were their inhabitants not descendants from Eden? In the case of both the Americas and Africa, there was, as well, the production of ethnographic texts in which European words replaced and represented those of the native.5 In the case of Asia, a different result was the collection and translation of significant texts in hitherto unknown languages.6 Then too, there were, also, in Asia, contacts with kinds of Christianities, not experienced since the thirteenth century, whose difference from familiar European forms was often perceived as more problematic and therefore more threatening than native religions.
(3) This latter perception resonated with a European one in which the schismatic impulses of emergent Protestantisms raised a host of questions as to religious credibility and truth. These rival claims to authority made implausible older heresiological explanations for internal diversities.7
In each of these cases, languages and religions became the privileged cultural formations in which the controversies of unity and difference were framed. Indeed, as already suggested, it was most often the then regnant linguistic model of essence/accidence that governed these controversies when applied to religion. It is, therefore, here, as The Renaissance pattern was modified through Enlightenment, counter-Enlightenment and Romantic theories of language and religion, which brings us to the threshold of the moder enterprise of the study of religion -although I will signal, here, only one trajectory of new elements in linguistic theory which was taken over into thinking about religion.
Enlightenment interest in language is a by-product of its preeminent concern for thought and thoughtfulness, an emphasis that must be 
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reaffirmed by any scholar of religion, while prescinding from some of its formulations of this concern. For example, unity and uniformity were revalued as universalism; difference was stigmatized as irrational. Their sometimes vision of an abstract, universal humanity required the imagination of the possibility of an equally abstract, universal language in which all would be transparent, in which decipherment would be superfluous.9 Language was thus conceived as a secondary tool for the expression of thought, with the development of the former the result of the progressive refinement of the latter. To quote one eighteenth-century authority, language "being entirely the invention of man, must have been exceedingly rude and imperfect at first, and must have arrived by slow degrees at greater and greater perfection, as the reasoning faculties acquired vigour and acuteness."10 The only question was whether the perfecting of language was best achieved by controlling the denotation of signs or the regularization of grammar.
The counter-Enlightenment takes the issue of thoughtfulness in a new direction, one as yet insufficiently appropriated by scholars of religion.11 Language, it was argued, is not a secondary naming or memorializing; it is not a translation of thought, it is not posterior to experience, rather, it is the very way in which we think and experience. The human sciences become conceptually possible largely through the acceptance of the counter-Enlightenment argument that their objects of study are holistic linguistic and language-like systems, and that, For a certain sort of grand theorist in the study of religion, two aspects of Romantic theories of language proved most compelling. First, the reassertion, against the Enlightenment, of the supreme value of uniqueness, singularity, or individuality in the name of the creative, free expression of will. Second, and of greater import, the identification of poetic language, in opposition to the prosaic, as intransitive, as a non-pragmatic, autonomous totality, a thing-in-itself. In such a view, there is no gap between signifier and signified. The counter-Enlightenment's insistence on the non-secondary character of language has now been transformed into the transparency of selfdisclosure. From poetry to myth is but a small step; Schelling, most famously, made the translation:
Each figure in mythology is to be taken for what it is, for it is precisely in this way that it will be taken for what it signifies. The signifying here is at the same time the being itself, it has passed into the object, being one with it. No sooner do we allow these beings to signify something than they are no longer anything themselves ... Indeed, their greatest attraction lies in the fact that, whereas they only are, without any relation, absolute in themselves, they still allow signification to shine through.
Mythology is not allegorical; it is tautegorical. For mythology, the gods are beings that really exist; instead of being one thing and signifying another, they signify only what they are. Allegory, one of the prime modes of interpreting myth for more than a millennium, is here dethroned; the hermeneutics of 'speaking- new ethos of particularism that challenges the global ambitions which, from time to time, have animated the field. But, more can be said. There is the sheer effort involved in gaining proficiency, to the best of ones ability, in difficult languages, often first encountered in the course of graduate studies. While such language studies, taken together, constitute one of our major achievements over the past two centuries, their result has been that language instruction consumes a disproportionate amount of time in the training of the historian of religions. As certification in language ability has increasingly come to be the criterion for achieving professional status, other matters, preeminently those associated with mastering the second-order discourse of the field, get pushed to the side. Philology is the vocation; generalization and theory, the avocation. This has led to the wholesale adoption of a sort of common-sense descriptive discourse as a major rhetoric for the work of the field.
It is possible to point to a variety of practices symptomatic of this sort of discourse in which everything is treated as a self-evident instance of ostension. Texts are pointed to, paraphrased, or summarized as if their citation is, by itself, sufficient to guarantee significance. When translation is undertaken, it is without an explicit theory of translation; rather reproduction and verbal congruence are assumed to be values in their own right. Comparisons are limited to those grounded in common genealogy or spatial contiguity.
The ostensive nature of these practices serve a protective role. In each of these, the unity, the integrity of the subject for study is preserved. Like the Mosaic altar, such practices guarantee that the scholar's work will be built of "whole stones," that the injunction, "thou shalt not lift up any iron tool upon them," (Deuteronomy 27.5-6) has been piously observed; that like the Temple of Solomon, "there was neither hammer nor axe nor any tool of iron heard in the house while it was in building" (1 Kings 6.7). By means of such practices, the handicraft of the scholar is disguised so as to give the appearance of achieving "a house not made with hands" (Acts 7.48). Such an attitude, as Bakhtin pointed out, has as one of its causes philology's focus on guage appropriate to another domain (the unknown/the unfamiliar). Perhaps the strongest example of this procedure in the study of religion is Durkheim's translation of the language appropriate to religion (for him, the unknown) into the language appropriate for society (the known). The point at which one may differ from Durkheim's project is with respect to his acceptance of the goal of explanatory simplicity. Better, here, is L6vi-Strauss's formulation: "scientific explanation consists not in a movement from the complex to the simple but in the substitution of a more intelligible complexity for another which is less."21 While the adequacy of any translation proposal may be debated, an argument made more difficult by the lack of elaborated theories of translation by scholars of religion, the only grounds for rejecting such a procedure is to attack the possibility of translation-itself, most often attempted through appeals to incommensurability. Such appeals, if accepted, must entail the conclusion that the enterprise of the human sciences is, strictly speaking, impossible.22 I would note only two implications of translation. First, translation, as an affair of language, is a relentlessly social activity, a matter of public meaning rather than of individual significance. Here, for the study of religion, the public is, first of all, the academic community and, therefore, a central issue becomes one of specifying the relations between the study of 'religion' and other disciplinary endeavors, a 
